The strategy of conflict / Thomas C. Schelling. -

Por: Schelling, Thomas C. 2005 Nobel Laureate in EconomicsTipo de material: TextoTextoDetalles de publicación: London : Harvard, 1980. Descripción: 309 p.; 14 x 21 cm.ISBN: 9780674840317Tema(s): STRATEGY COMUNISM UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Contenidos:
I. ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF STRATEGY 1. The retarded Science of International Strategy 2. An essay on Bargaining 3. Bargaining, communication and limited war
II. A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY 4. Toward a theory of independent decision 5. Enforcement, communication and strategic moves 6. Game theory and experimental research
III. STRATEGY WITH A RANDOM INGREDIENT 7. Randomization of promises and threats 8. The threat that leaves something to chance
IV. SURPRISE ATTACK: A STUDY IN MUTUAL DISTRUST 9. The reciprocal fear of surprise attack 10. Surprise attack and disarmament
APPENDICES A. Nuclear weapons and limited war B. For the abandonment of symmetry in game theory C. Re-interpretation of a solution concept for "Noncooperative" games
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I. ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF STRATEGY 1. The retarded Science of International Strategy 2. An essay on Bargaining 3. Bargaining, communication and limited war

II. A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY 4. Toward a theory of independent decision 5. Enforcement, communication and strategic moves 6. Game theory and experimental research

III. STRATEGY WITH A RANDOM INGREDIENT 7. Randomization of promises and threats 8. The threat that leaves something to chance

IV. SURPRISE ATTACK: A STUDY IN MUTUAL DISTRUST 9. The reciprocal fear of surprise attack 10. Surprise attack and disarmament

APPENDICES A. Nuclear weapons and limited war B. For the abandonment of symmetry in game theory C. Re-interpretation of a solution concept for "Noncooperative" games

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