000			01375nam a22002417a 4500
003			CEFA
008			190918b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 spa d
020			_a9780674840317
040			_aESGN _cESGN
100			_914343 _aSchelling, Thomas C. _c2005 Nobel Laureate in Economics
245			_aThe strategy of conflict / _cThomas C. Schelling. -
260			_aLondon : _bHarvard, _c1980.
300			_a309 p.; _c14 x 21 cm.
505			_aI. ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF STRATEGY 1. The retarded Science of International Strategy 2. An essay on Bargaining 3. Bargaining, communication and limited war
505			_aII. A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY 4. Toward a theory of independent decision 5. Enforcement, communication and strategic moves 6. Game theory and experimental research
505			_aIII. STRATEGY WITH A RANDOM INGREDIENT 7. Randomization of promises and threats 8. The threat that leaves something to chance
505			_aIV. SURPRISE ATTACK: A STUDY IN MUTUAL DISTRUST 9. The reciprocal fear of surprise attack 10. Surprise attack and disarmament
505			_aAPPENDICES A. Nuclear weapons and limited war B. For the abandonment of symmetry in game theory C. Re-interpretation of a solution concept for "Noncooperative" games
653			_aSTRATEGY _aCOMUNISM _aUNITED STATES OF AMERICA
942			_2udc _cBK
999			_c47372 _d47372